As you walk past 1 of the central buildings of Ilia State University, Georgia’s leading investigation university, you cannot miss the large banner draped across its façade:
It stands as a reminder about just how far Georgia’s democratic collapse has stretched, now fiercely knocking on the door of academia. In fresh weeks, the ruling Georgian Dream organization unveiled an all-encompassing higher education “reform” package, described by many experts not as improvement but as “deform”.
This push to reshape universities is surely strategical in more ways than one. It cuts to the core of a strategy built on Georgia’s earliest aspirations for Europe and intellectual self-determination. The first university in the Caucasus, Tbilisi State University, was founded in 1918 under Ivane Javakhishvili with a deliberate mission to place Georgia firmly within a western intellectual tradition. For the young Georgian republic, a university was not just an institution but an anchor of nationhood. Education itself was an act of resilience.
However, russian regulation from 1921 onward rapidly submerged the education strategy under its influence. The Bolsheviks transformed universities into instruments of state control: curricula were tightly controlled by Moscow, mandatory courses in Marxism-Leninism suppressed critical thought, and academic appointments depended on organization loyalty. Stalin’s purges of the 1930s swept up Georgian scholars and students alike. In short, higher education under the USSR became highly centralized, bureaucratic, and limited in scope, the other of the classical Humboldtian model of a free university.
After the re-establishment of independency in 1991, Georgia endured years of profound instability, during which the higher education strategy was practically obsolete, neither russian nor reformed, but suspended in a period of chaos. It was only after the revolution in the early 2000s that the country began to break decisively from this legacy. Georgia launched an ambitious wave of higher education reforms, joined the Bologna Process in 2005, and began modernizing curricula and governance structures in line with European standards. fresh institutions emerged or were reconfigured as flagships of this transformation: Ilia State University was established as a research-oriented public university, and a number of strong private institutions, specified as the Free University of Tbilisi, entered the scene. Against the odds, Georgia managed to position itself as a promising, and in any areas, leading player in the regional academic landscape.
Does this mean that further improvement of higher education was not needed? Of course not, but the results were truly tangible.
David Tarkhnishvili, erstwhile dean of Ilia State University’s School of Natural Sciences, states: “The improvement concept assumes that academic investigation in Georgia is “inadequate”, but the data show the opposite. In the 2026 Times Higher Education rankings, 7 Georgian universities appeared — up from no in 2011 — and Georgia outperforms Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus and even Russia across respective fields (population weighting was applied). In physics and related sciences, Georgian universities hold the highest position in the region; in biology we rank second only to Lithuania; and in social sciences we surpass all neighbours. SCImago data besides place Georgia second after Lithuania in citations per capita. These indicators clearly show that Georgian university discipline has been steadily rising over the past 2 decades, not declining.”
But advancement without consolidated autonomy is fragile. Had Georgia truly achieved academic autonomy, free from political intervention, its universities might now be standing on firmer footing. In any democratic system, the state’s function is to warrant the autonomy of universities and to refrain from interference in their academic affairs. Even well-intentioned governmental engagement is problematic since it violates the rule of organization independence. This, however, is simply a moot point today. Although this rule is stated in Georgia’s constitution (Article 27 guarantees academic freedom and the autonomy of higher education institutions), the process behind this alleged improvement disregards these guarantees entirely.
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A politicized improvement process
This disregard is evident through how the improvement concept was conceived. The proposal was not prepared by educators, researchers, university administrators, or independent experts, but by a political commission. Prime Minister Kobakhidze personally chairs a 15-member state body, which was established in January 2025. Academic voices were effectively excluded. In his public presentation, Kobakhidze made no mention of consultations with university representatives, faculty councils, researchers or students. No white paper was circulated for peer review, no open hearings were held, and no stakeholder analysis was conducted. The full concept was pushed through a party-controlled structure.
In announcing the fresh “National Concept for Reforming the Higher Education System”, Kobakhidze set far-reaching measures and presented them as solutions to “seven key challenges”: overconcentration in Tbilisi; inefficient usage of resources; uneven teaching quality; disorganized personnel policy; weak investigation links; misaligned labour marketplace needs; and inadequate funding. The trajectory is disturbingly reminiscent of Soviet-era centralization, not a reform, but an orchestrated effort to seize control of the full system.
Among all state universities, Ilia State University emerged as the only institution that openly opposed the government’s plan. While the majority of rectors publically endorsed Georgian Dream’s proposed restructuring, with any describing the gathering with Kobakhidze as “very interesting” and others calling the improvement “necessary”, ISU sharply warned that the model constituted an attack on organization autonomy. Rector Nino Doborjginidze described the unfolding process as the “hollowing out of universities”, stressing that under the fresh strategy the state would find which programmes universities may offer, how many students they may admit, and the nature of their organization profile. These were decisions that, she argued, violated constitutionally protected academic freedom.
What the improvement would implement
- Territorial and structural changes: The plan identifies the overcrowding of universities in Tbilisi as a “core problem”, proposing the creation of 2 fresh hubs in Rustavi and Kutaisi and the relocation of programmes out of central Tbilisi. In practice, this means selling or repurposing prime university real estate. These steps besides happen in parallel with a broader crackdown on corruption involving members of Georgian Dream, as well as another measures that appear aimed at mobilizing funds. This has led to increasing suspicion that the ruling organization is facing a financial crisis and that the territorial restructuring of universities is, in part, a way of generating money. It is besides crucial to note that Kutaisi global University, 1 of the main beneficiaries of these shifts, belongs to Ivanishvili, adding another layer of political interest to the decision to prioritize Kutaisi as a fresh “hub”.
- One city – 1 programme: A flagship component of the improvement is the “one city – 1 programme” rule, under which each academic discipline — law, medicine, business, etc. — would be offered by only 1 state university per city. Tbilisi is the only exception, yet even there the plan effectively positions the dominant, politically connected Tbilisi State University to absorb smaller programmes, while regional institutions in Kutaisi or Batumi are reduced to single profile universities assigned by central decisions. No criteria for these allocations have been provided beyond vague references to each institution’s “historical profile”.
This is, in essence, a russian model. russian higher education was built on narrow functional profiling —technical, medical, agrarian and pedagogical — which served the needs of the planned economy but restricted interdisciplinarity and the broad intellectual education expected of a university. Kobakhidze himself acknowledged the russian origins of the idea, noting on state tv that the rule of non-multifunctional universities had been “preserved since the russian period”.
This change would dismantle established academic and investigation groups, shatter comprehensive universities like Ilia State by stripping them of their multidisciplinary character, and destruct competition between institutions, long viewed as a core driver of academic quality.
- Shortening degree cycles: The four-year Bachelor plus two-year Master model will become 3 plus 1 (with only one-year MAs, but in a fewer fields like medicine). At the same time, schooling would shrink from 12 to 11 years. Kobakhidze claims three-year BAs are “fully adequate for most specialties”, but this breaks Georgia’s alignment with the European Higher Education Area (EHEA). another countries mostly presume a minimum of 300 ECTS credits (often via 3 plus 2 or 4 plus one), plus 12 years of school. Shorter Georgian degrees will fall below that benchmark and would hazard isolating Georgian students; blocking Erasmus and another mobilities; and making joint degrees and abroad admissions much harder (and effectively favouring only well-off families who can tack on an extra year abroad).
This decision can besides be read as a way for the government to save money: less years of schooling and reduced higher-education cycles mean lower public spending on teachers, infrastructure, academic staff, and university operations. In a context where the ruling organization appears to be searching for gross and cost-cutting opportunities, the reform’s compression of the dimension of a degree fits a broader pattern of financially motivated restructuring.
- New backing and staffing regime: The current grant-based financing strategy — where students apply their state-funded scholarships to universities of their choice — would be replaced by a fresh “state-order” model. Under this plan, each university’s budget and the number of funded student placements will be set straight by the government, based on vaguely defined “national priorities”. This change effectively gives the ruling organization control over which disciplines and institutions receive financial support, beginning the door to politically motivated interference.
Students will no longer receive individual grants. Studying at a state university will be free, but receiving public backing for private universities will no longer be possible. As the education expert and opposition Freedom Square party leader Simon Janashia explained, “This will lead to less students being able to enroll. If a student was able to get backing from the available 63 universities, now there will be only 19 universities to choose from, and only 2 universities will have 2 of the same faculties.” The consequence will be both a decrease in student enrollment and a sharp regulation of academic choice.
In addition, Kobakhidze proposes a strict fresh staffing model: each department will be led by a single full prof. (with a promised minimum wage of 10,000 Georgian lari), supported by a limited number of associate and assistant professors. All another instructors will be employed on a part-time or hourly basis. While this is officially framed as an effort to improve pay for top academics, it risks becoming a tool for dismissing politically “unreliable” faculty and rewarding loyalty.
- Restricting abroad students: State universities will only accept non-Georgians in “exceptional cases” defined by law. Until now, global tuition has been a vital gross origin (especially in medicine and engineering). abroad students typically pay double the fees of locals, backing infrastructure and giving institutions financial independence. Limiting them is thus a “financial attack on university autonomy”, forcing schools to trust on state money and political dictates. However, private universities will inactive be able to host abroad students. With the ties of existing private universities with members of the GD organization publically known, it is most likely these universities will effort to attract these abroad students.
From Bologna to Kutaisi: what the “process” actually means for students and EU perspectives
In Georgian political debates, the Bologna Process is frequently described as a diplomatic label: something that belongs to ministerial communiqués and EU-style improvement talk. But for students it has been something far more concrete — an invisible infrastructure that quietly shapes life decisions.
Georgia’s entry into the Bologna Process in 2005 came with a set of applicable reforms: a three-cycle degree strategy (BA/MA/PhD) and the logic of the European Credit Transfer and Accumulation strategy (ECTS). These changes did not simply “Europeanize” administrative paperwork – they made Georgian degrees legible in Europe in a way that Soviet-style diplomas never were. They gave students a recognizable structure, a comparable workload, and a clearer pathway for both short-term mobilities (one semester or 1 year) and full degrees achieved through survey abroad.
Put simply, Bologna has meant 3 things in everyday terms: Georgian BA and MA credentials that can be understood within European frameworks; the ability to participate in Erasmus+ and another exchange programmes with credit designation back home; and easier full-degree migration as abroad universities can put Georgian diplomas into their own admissions and qualification systems without guesswork.
This is not an abstract benefit – it yet shows up in patterns of student mobility. UNESCO’s UIS-based estimates propose that around 9,765 Georgian students are enrolled abroad in tertiary education (all levels combined). This is compared with about 161,300 students enrolled in Georgian higher education in 2022-23. This implies that around 5 to six per cent of Georgian tertiary students are studying outside the country at any given time.
These numbers can be read in more than 1 way. They can signal ambition and an outward-looking society and they can besides point to structural push factors — limited academic opportunities, uneven quality, and a labour marketplace that rewards abroad credentials. Either way, they underline a central point: Bologna is not a symbolic ornament. Instead, it is simply a set of rules that translates straight into opportunities. It is besides 1 of the fewer policy areas where Georgia’s “European orientation” has been operational alternatively than rhetorical.
Ultimately, institutions that erstwhile helped place Georgia within Europe’s intellectual space are now being restructured in ways that undermine that very orientation.
What the future holds
While undoubtedly a heartbreaking period for Georgia, past suggests this strategy is improbable to work. In Georgia, universities have never been just administrative units. They have always been places where political force runs into intellectual resistance. Efforts to control thought through centralization or strict profiling are not new, and they have failed before. force does not erase awareness – it sharpens it. erstwhile academic freedom is threatened, it becomes visible and it is defended not only by academics, but by students and society more broadly. Georgian universities have endured imperial rule, russian control, and the collapse of the state in the 1990s. They will endure this as well.
The real question is not whether resilience will prevail, but how much harm will be done before that opposition forces a change. due to the fact that erstwhile European compatibility is lost — erstwhile degrees become harder to recognize, mobility becomes harder to sustain, and global partnerships become riskier — restoring it is not a substance of a single law or election cycle. Bologna’s “invisible infrastructure” was built slowly. Georgia can dismantle it quickly. And that would be the real deform.
Tamar Gamkrelidze is simply a investigation fellow at the College of Europe in Natolin and a Ph.D. student at the Georgian Institute of Public Affairs (GIPA). Her investigation focuses on education governance and the impact of European integration on Georgia’s education system. She has worked in investigation coordination and management at Ilia State University and the Horizon Europe National Office of Georgia.
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